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VINE OF THE DEAD: REVIVING EQUAL PROTECTION
RITES FOR RELIGIOUS DRUG USE
David Garrett*
I. Introduction
In 2000, a small religious group from New Mexico filed a motion for
preliminary injunction against the government, challenging a ban on the
group's use of a hallucinogenic tea imported from Brazil.' The district court
granted a preliminary injunction under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).2 The Tenth Circuit affirmed.3 In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme
Court also affirmed, and found that the government failed to demonstrate a
compelling interest in barring the group's religious use of the hallucinogen.4
The religious group, however, also asserted an equal protection argument,
claiming that the group should receive a federal exemption from the
Controlled Substances Act5 for the use and importation of their drug, similar
to the peyote exemption for the Native American Church.6 The district court
wrongly rejected the equal protection claim.
Part II of this note will discuss the background of the parties involved with
this issue, as well as the relevant legal authorities. Part III will summarize the
case at hand on the district and appellate levels, as well as the memorandum
opinion, which exclusively covers the equal protection issue. Part IV will
analyze the equal protection issue and the Court's decision. Part V will
conclude the note.
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft (0 Centro1), 282 F. Supp.
2d 1236, 1238, 1240 (D.N.M. 2002), aff#d, 342 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2003), aft'den banc, 389
F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 2004), aft'd, Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal,
126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006).
2. Id. at 1271; see Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb
(2000).
3. 0 Centro, 389 F.3d at 976 (per curiam).
4. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1216
(2006).
5. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
6. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft (O Centro1), 282 F. Supp.
2d 1236, 1244 n.3 (D.N.M. 2002).
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II. Background
A. Uniao do Vegetal
Uniao do Vegetal (UDV) is a religious movement known for its reliance
on hoasca,7 an entheogenic herbal tea consumed primarily for spiritual
enlightenment.' UDV may be best characterized as a Christian Spiritist sect
with shamanistic roots.9 Though the UDV church is relatively young,'I
shamanistic practices have existed for thousands of years. " Throughout time,
shamans have been credited with powers to diagnose and cure human illness,
interpret dreams, predict the future, and converse with spirits. 2 These powers
are associated with the ability to achieve an out-of-body experience known
as "trance," where a shaman summons his soul to traverse a parallel spiritual
dimension. 3 To accomplish the altered state of consciousness required for
trance, shamans use a variety of methods such as chanting, dancing,
drumming, and especially the use of entheogenic hallucinogens like hoasca,
which are often derived from plants. 4 Thus, hoasca is essential to
7. "Hoasca," in the Quechua Indian language means "vine of the dead," or "vine of the
soul." 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th
Cir. 2003). Hoasca is made by blending together two indigenous Brazilian plants, banisteriopsis
caapi and psychotria viridis. Id. at 1175. Psychotria contains dimethyltryptamine (DMT), a
federally prohibited substance. Id. Banisteriopsis contains harmala alkaloids, also known as
beta-carbolines that allow DMT's hallucinogenic effects to transpire by suppressing monoamine
oxidase enzymes in the digestive system that would otherwise dissolve the DMT. Id. Thus,
when the two plants are united within the digestive system, usually in the form of a tea-like
substance, they allow DMT to influence the mind in quantities sufficient to substantially alter
the present state of consciousness. Id.
8. Gabrielle Raemy Charest, The Visionary Vine: When Domestic Religious Freedom and
International Law Conflict, 12 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 435, 438-39 (2004).
9. Id. at 438; see also 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211,
1217 (2006).
10. Jose Gabriel Da Costa, who is called Mestre Gabriel by UDV members, founded the
church in Brazil in 1961. UDV-A Sagrada Uniao, http://www.udv.org.br/english/area amarela/
index.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2006). UDV officially established a branch in the United
States in 1993, which is headed by Jeffrey Bronfrnan, as representative mestre and president of
UDV. See 0 Centro, 342 F.3d at 1172, 1174-75. The United States branch has roughly 130
members, and its headquarters are located in Santa Fe, New Mexico. Id. at 1174-75.
11. See MIRANDA & STEPHEN ALDHOUSE-GREEN, THE QUEST FOR THE SHAMAN: SHAPE-
SHIFTERS, SORCERERS AND SPIRIT-HEALERS OF ANCiENT EUROPE 19-21 (2005) (referring to
Stone Age cave art).
12. See PIERS VITEBSKY, SHAMANISM 98-105 (Univ. of Okla. Press 2001) (1995).
13. See id. at 70-73; see also ALDHOUSE-GREEN, supra note 11, at 12.
14. ALDHOUSE-GREEN, supra note 11, at 12; see also 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao
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shamanistic based practices like UDV. 5 UDV's doctrine dictates that
"members can perceive and understand God only by drinking hoasca."' 6
The importance of hoasca to UDV may be likened to the Native American
Church's (NAC) reliance on peyote. Peyote, like hoasca, is cultivated
primarily for its hallucinogenic properties and considered a vital religious
sacrament, particularly by the NAC. 7 In fact, the NAC has also been referred
to as "Peyotism" or the "Peyote religion.' '
Though not considered a "popular" drug, peyote has been the focus of
much adjudication and statutory law for decades, as courts and legislators
have struggled to balance many competing interests.' The various cases can
be contrasted, but the parties' interests are substantially similar. Religious
members who desire to partake of sacramental entheogens claim an interest
in religious freedom stemming from various authorities such as the First
Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and Equal Protection
Clause. 20 The government, on the other hand, claims an interest in preventing
the health and safety risks imposed by the "controlled substances" used by
religious groups, as well as preventing diversion of such substances,
especially for non-religious use.2 Society's interests, as always, fall on both
sides of the fulcrum.
B. Relevant Authorities
1. The United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances2 and the
Controlled Substances Act"
The United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances (Convention)
do Vegetal v. Ashcroft (0 Centro 1), 282 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (D.N.M. 2002).
15. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 1170, 1174
(10th Cir. 2003).
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. See United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1335 (D.N.M. 1991) (quoting statements
from Omer C. Stewart).
18. See id. (referring to the religion of the NAC as the "Peyote Religion"); see also State
v. Brashear, 593 P.2d 63, 67-68 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (referring to the NAC religion as
"peyotism").
19. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990);
Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991).
20. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-77; Peyote Way, 922 F.2d at 1213-14, 1216, 1220.
21. Smith, 494 U.S. at 904-05.
22. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971,32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S.
175 (United States entered into force on July 15, 1980) [hereinafter Convention].
23. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
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is an international law representing a global stance on a variety of drugs.2 4
The preamble clearly reveals the Convention's premise: it is "concerned with
the health and welfare of mankind . . ." and the "public health and social
problems resulting from the abuse of certain psychotropic substances., 25 The
Convention characterizes specific substances through several schedules.
26
These schedules serve to categorize the drugs by their beneficial medicinal
and scientific value, as well as their propensity for abuse.27
The Convention does not independently impose itself on the world, but
rather requires ratification by signatory states. 2' The Controlled Substances
Ace 9 (CSA) represents the United States' signature to the Convention, and is
essentially a domestic reflection of its international counterpart. Like the
Convention, it is illegal under the CSA to "manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, or possess.. ." a controlled substance.3" Also, the CSA classifies
controlled substances through schedules according to each drug's degree of
potential abuse and accepted medicinal or scientific value.3
2. The First Amendment
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...
This provision comprises both the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause respectively. In Abington School District v. Schempp,33
Justice Brennan explained that "the Establishment Clause [is] a co-guarantor,
with the Free Exercise Clause, of religious liberty. The Framers did not
entrust the liberty of religious beliefs to either clause alone."34 Despite their
ideal compatibility however, the two clauses are often in tension with one
another because "any time the government acts to protect free exercise of
religion, its primary purpose is to advance religion.. ." but on the other hand,
24. Convention, supra note 22.
25. Id.
26. Id. art. 1(e).
27. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 1170, 1175
(10th Cir. 2003).
28. Charest, supra note 8, at 444.
29. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
30. Id. § 841(a)(1).
31. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft (0 Centro 1), 282 F. Supp.
2d 1236, 1248 (D.N.M. 2002).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
33. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
34. Id. at 256 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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"any time the principle effect is to facilitate free exercise, the government is
aiding religion."35
It is likewise no surprise then, that the Supreme Court has found it
especially difficult to find "a neutral course between the two religion clauses,
both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to
a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other."36 This difficulty may
be exacerbated by the fact that the Court has developed separate analysis for
evaluating government action under the two clauses.
In 1963, the Court, in Sherbert v. Verner,37 held that strict scrutiny was the
appropriate standard for evaluating laws that burden the free exercise of
religion." In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, the Court rejected the strict scrutiny standard for challenges
to neutral laws of general applicability. 39 Smith held that the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment did not prohibit Oregon from applying its
drug laws to ceremonial consumption of peyote, accordingly, the state could
deny respondents' unemployment compensation after their employer
dismissed them for using the drug.4'
The Smith Court recognized religion as encompassing two realms, beliefs
and practices, noting that although laws "cannot interfere with mere religious
belief and opinions, they may with practices."' To hold otherwise, the Court
found, would be to make "religious belief superior to the law of the land, and
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself""2
3. Religious Freedom Restoration Act43
The Smith decision created a political and religious uproar. Opponents
criticized the opinion for its misuse of precedent, and its lack of sensitivity
toward minority religious groups, especially Native Americans." Essentially,
the Smith Court stated that those seeking religious exemptions from laws
35. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PoUclEs 1141 (2d ed.
2003).
36. Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
37. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
38. Id. at 403.
39. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 n.3 (1990).
40. Id. at 890.
41. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878)).
42. Id.
43. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
44. See generally Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Hallucinations of Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote
Case, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1991).
No. 1]
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should use the democratic process for relief, instead of the courts.45
Inevitably, Smith's opponents did exactly that. In 1993, Congress responded
to the Smith decision by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).46 The RFRA states that its purpose is "to restore the compelling
interest test as set forth in [Sherbert], and to guarantee its application in all
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened." '47
Not surprisingly, various religious groups, including UDV, have invoked
protection from the RFRA in order to maintain their religious practices.48
Ultimately, the UDV cases were decided on the RFRA issue, and so likely
will many similar cases in the future. However, this note will focus primarily
on UDV's equal protection claim.
III. The UDV Cases
A. District Court
At the district level, the court in 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do
Vegetal v. Ashcroft (0 Centro J)49 granted UDV's request for a preliminary
injunction, thus allowing the importation of hoasca.5° The primary purpose
of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the parties' status quo in order to
maintain the last uncontested status between them until the court renders a
judgment on the merits.5 A court's broad discretion in granting preliminary
injunctions is guided by four standards.52 The party moving for preliminary
injunction must show:
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the case; (2)
irreparable injury to the movant if the preliminary injunction is
denied; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the
injury to the other party under the preliminary injunction; and (4)
the injunction is not adverse to the public interest.53
45. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
46. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
47. Id. § 2000bb(b)(l).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996).
49. 282 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D.N.M. 2002).
50. Id. at 1270.
51. Id. at 1269.
52. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 1170, 1177
(10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 955 (2001)).
53. Id.
[Vol. 31
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol31/iss1/6
NOTES
Additionally, if the preliminary injunction would alter the status quo
relationship between the parties, the plaintiff has a heightened burden in
showing that these four factors "weigh heavily and compellingly in [its]
favor. '
54
In the first district court case, UDV raised the following five issues in its
motion for preliminary injunction: (1) that the federal government had
infringed its rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, made applicable to federal statutes by the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, by selectively enforcing the Controlled Substances
Act (CSA) against them; (2) that the CSA's treatment of dimethyltryptamine
(DMT) as a controlled substance does not extend to include hoasca; (3) that
by interpreting the CSA to prohibit their use of hoasca, the government
violated their First Amendment rights under the Free Exercise Clause by
restricting their religious practice; (4) that international law required the
United States government to permit ceremonial use of hoasca; and (5) that the
government did not meet the heavy burden imposed on it by the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to prove that the CSA's restriction on their
use of hoasca furthers a compelling governmental interest through the least
restrictive means. 5
The district court rejected the first four arguments, holding that (1) the
government did not violate UDV's rights under the equal protection clause,
(2) the plain language of the CSA chosen by Congress clearly covered hoasca
as a controlled substance, (3) the government did not infringe UDV's rights
under the First Amendment, and (4) the Convention did not override
Congress' clear application of the CSA to any use of hoasca in the United
States.56 The district court, however, found that the government did not meet
the heightened burden imposed by the RFRA, requiring the government to
show that the CSA's restriction on UDV's "religious practices regarding
hoasca furthers a compelling governmental interest through the least
restrictive means.
57
B. Appellate Court
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision
for the same reasons. 8 Like the district court, the appellate court was not
54. Id. (quoting SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc. 936 F.2d 1096, 1099 (10th Cir. 1991)).
55. 0 Centro 1, 282 F. Supp. 2d. at 1239-40.
56. Id. at 1239.
57. Id.
58. 0 Centro, 342 F.3d at 1187.
No. 1]
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persuaded by UDV's first four arguments, but found that the government did
not meet its heightened burden under the RFRA.5 The court gave more
consideration in determining the parties' status quo - their last uncontested
status before the controversy.60 The significance of the status quo here, is that
"[ilf a preliminary injunction alters the status quo, a plaintiff must 'show that
on balance, the four [preliminary injunction] factors weigh heavily and
compellingly in [its] favor."' 6' In other words, if the status quo was the
enforcement of the CSA against UDV, as the government asserts, then UDV
would be seeking to alter the status quo, and thus would have a heightened
burden to establish the four factors mentioned above. UDV, of course, claims
that the status quo in this case should be viewed as their valid importation of
hoasca before the government enforced the CSA against them.62 According
to the court, "[T]o say the enforcement of the CSA and the Convention
against UDV is the status quo ignores the part played in this case by the
RFRA.' The court found that the UDV had established a prima facie case
under the RFRA, to which the government conceded, and that the
government's "concession buttresses the conclusion that the status quo here
is not the need to enforce the CSA but rather UDV's religious practice free
from a governmentally imposed burden.""
C. Equal Protection: The Memorandum Opinion
At both the district and appellate levels, UDV asserted an equal protection
claim that was denied.65 Specifically, UDV argued that the CSA is not neutral
between religions because the law provides an exemption for the ceremonial
use of peyote by the Native American Church (NAC)."
The court began its analysis by stating that the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment "is essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike."' 7  The court noted UDV's
argument "relies on a comparison between the government's treatment of
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1177.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1178.
64. Id. at 1179.
65. See 0 Centro II, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1284 (D.N.M. 2002); 0 Centro, 342 F.3d at
1186 n.4.
66. O Centro II, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1275; O Centro, 342 F.3d at 1186 n.4.
67. 0 Centro II, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
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UDV and its treatment of the [NAC]." 8 Because the NAC received a
statutory exemption on peyote, a prohibited Schedule I substance, UDV
asserted that it too should also receive an exemption.69 This exemption is
stated in 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31, which mandates that "[t]he listing of peyote as
a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to the nondrug use of
peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, and
members of the Native American Church so using peyote are exempt from
registration. 70  The New Mexico district court noted the government's
observation that in addition to the regulation, a federal statute also grants an
exemption for the ceremonial use of peyote for Native Americans. 7' This
federal statute is the American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments
(AIRFAA), which provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
law, the use, possession, or transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide
traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional
Indian religion is lawful .... ,,7
The government argued that UDV and the NAC are not similarly situated
under equal protection analysis. 73 According to the government, one "crucial
difference between [UDV's] situation and that of Native American peyote
users lies in the unique relationship between the federal government and
Indian tribes., 74 In support of this proposition, the government relied on
Morton v. Mancari.75 In Mancari, a group of non-Indian employees of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) challenged the agency's hiring preference for
Indian employees. 76  The plaintiffs asserted that this hiring preference
amounted to "invidious racial discrimination., 77 The Mancari Court found
that the BIA hiring preference "is not directed towards a 'racial' group
consisting of 'Indians,"' but rather "only to members of 'federally
recognized' tribes. 78  Thus, the Court characterized the preferences as
political rather than racial in nature.79 In denying the plaintiff's claim, the
68. Id. at 1275.
69. Id.
70. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1985).
71. 0 Centro II, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2000).
73. 0 Centro HI, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
74. Id.
75. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
76. Id. at 539.
77. Id. at 551.
78. Id. at 553.
79. Id. at 552-53.
No. 1]
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Mancari Court noted "the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal
law" and of "the plenary power of Congress, based on a history of treaties and
the assumption of a 'guardian-ward' status, to legislate on behalf of federally
recognized Indian tribes."8 The district court noted that Congress drew on
the trust responsibility described in Mancari when it created the AIRFAA.8"
In this statute, Congress found that "for many Indian people, the traditional
use of the peyote cactus as a religious sacrament has for centuries been
integral to a way of life, and significant in perpetuating Indian tribes and
cultures."82 Ultimately, the court agreed with the government, and concluded
that "the UDV is not similarly situated to the NAC such that the federal courts
must step in to declare that the government violates Equal Protection
principles by allowing an exemption only for the use of Peyote in the NAC.
' 83
IV. Analysis
The UDV and NAC are similarly situated in society such that the
government violates equal protection principles by failing to afford UDV
similar rights as the NAC. In its memorandum opinion, the district court
relied heavily on the fact that the federal government has a unique
relationship with Native American tribes. Taken too far, however, this
concept has resulted in an impermissible classification on the basis of
religion. The court's analysis, while not necessarily erroneous, is relatively
short-sighted. UDV's motion for preliminary injunction should have been
granted as to its equal protection claim.
A. The NA C and UD V: Similarities Between Time and Religion
The memorandum opinion and other cases, finding that the NAC and other
religious groups are not similarly situated in society, often accentuate the
differences between the Peyote Religion of the NAC and other religions,
while at the same time ignoring the similarities, which are admittedly not as
apparent. The memorandum opinion, as well as the authorities relied upon,
implies that the Peyote Religion has stood the test of time.' For example, the
opening text of the AIRFAA states that "the traditional ceremonial use of the
peyote cactus as a religious sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way
80. Id. at 551.
81. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcrofi (0 Centro II), 282 F.
Supp. 2d 1271, 1276 (D.N.M. 2002).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(a)(1) (2000).
83. 0 Centro I, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1284.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(a)(1).
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of life." 5 The court stated that "[p]eyote has a demonstrated track record of
religious use in the United States, while hoasca does not." 6 Similarly, in
Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh,7 the Fifth Circuit noted that the
federal NAC exemption allows Native Americans to "continue their
centuries-old tradition of peyote use....""
It is on this point which most courts fail to sufficiently distinguish a church
from a religion. While it is undoubtedly true that the use of peyote by Native
American people has existed for centuries, the NAC is not yet 100 years old,
as it was founded in Oklahoma in 1918.89 The court does not mention this
fact, and while it is not vital to the case, it may serve in narrowing one of the
supposed differences between UDV and the NAC. UDV was founded in
1961, merely four decades after the NAC.9° Furthermore, while various forms
of the Peyote Religion, a foundation of the NAC, have existed for centuries,
there is evidence that shamanistic practices, a foundation for UDV, have
existed for thousands of years.9
Additionally, the district court downplayed the similarities between
religious practice and origin between the NAC and UDV. Both UDV and the
Peyote Religion have roots in shamanism.92 As discussed above, shamanism
generally represents a range of traditional beliefs and practices that involve
the ability to cure and diagnose human illness, control the weather, and other
phenomenal powers, often achieved through the use of entheogenic
substances. 93  A shaman then, is referred to as one possessing these
supernatural abilities.'
However, the etymology of the word "shaman" is not strictly defined. The
word was derived from the language of the Evenk people of Siberia, and by
the twentieth century, was applied in North America to a wide spectrum of
medicine men.95 While many people still use the term "medicine man" to
refer to the one who was a spiritual healer in Native American tribes,
85. Id.
86. 0 Centro MI, 282 F. Supp. 2d. at 1284.
87. 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991).
88. Id. at 1216.
89. United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1336 (D.N.M. 1991).
90. 0 Centro I, 282 F. Supp. 2d. at 1240.
91. See generally ALDHOUSE-GREEN, supra note 11.
92. VIRGIL J. VOGEL, AMERICAN INDIAN MEDICINE 22-24 (1970) (discussing the shaman
as a central figure in Indian healing); see also Charest, supra note 8, at 438.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. VITEBSKY, supra note 12, at 10.
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ethnologists tend to use the word "shaman." '96 Some writers say that
"shamans" were never associated with Native American religions.97
Arguments of this type, however, seem to center more on the etymology of
the term "shaman" rather than the concept. The primary point is that in many
traditional Native American cultures, there was a spiritual leader who was
credited with the power to communicate with spirits, heal the sick, and other
powers similar to those traditionally associated with shamans, regardless of
what scholars label them.9" Like many traditional Native American tribes,
UDV's religious practices are shamanistic in origin and character." UDV,
like the NAC, uses an entheogenic substance to occasion a religious
experience, and believes the substance possesses healing powers."° Thus,
many courts overlook the extent of religious similarities that exists between
many sects of the NAC and UDV.
Although the Supreme Court did not specifically address UDV's equal
protection claim, Chief Justice Roberts, in a unanimous opinion, indicated the
lack of substantial, legal distinction between Indian tribes and UDV.W O'
According to the Court:
Everything the Government says about the DMT in hoasca -- that,
as a Schedule I substance, Congress has determined that it "has a
high potential for abuse,'"'has no currently accepted medical use,"
and has "a lack of accepted safety for use . . . under medical
supervision," - applies in equal measure to the mescaline in
peyote, yet both the Executive and Congress itself have decreed an
exception from the Controlled Substances Act for Native
American religious use of peyote. If such use is permitted in the
face of the congressional findings ... for hundreds of thousands
of Native Americans practicing their faith, it is difficult to see how
those same findings alone can preclude any consideration of a
similar exception for the 130 or so American members of the UDV
who want to practice theirs."°2
96. VOGEL, supra note 92, at 22.
97. Tori McElroy, Shamanism, http://www.angelfire.com/joumal/cathbodua/Shamanism.
html (last visited Nov. 21, 2006).
98. See VITEBSKY, supra note 12, at 93; see also ALDHOUSE-GREEN, supra note 11, at 164.
99. See discussion supra Part II.
100. See discussion supra Part II.
101. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1222
(2006).
102. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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Additionally, the Court responded in a like manner to the government's
assertion that its "unique relationship" with the tribes justifies its refusal to
extend the exemption over a Schedule I substance to UDV.
The Government responds that there is a "unique relationship"
between the United States and the Tribes, but never explains what
about that "unique" relationship justifies overriding the same
congressional findings on which the Government relies in resisting
any exception for the UDV's religious use of hoasca. In other
words, if any Schedule I substance is in fact always highly
dangerous in any amount no matter how used, what about the
unique relationship with the Tribes justifies allowing their use of
peyote? Nothing about the unique political status of the Tribes
makes their members immune from the health risks the
Government asserts accompany any use of a Schedule I substance,
nor insulates the Schedule I substance the Tribes use in religious
exercise from the alleged risk of diversion."°3
B. NAC Membership: The Crux of the Issue
As mentioned previously, the government cited Morton v. Mancari in the
memorandum to show that Congress relied on the Court's description of a
"guardian-ward" status and the "unique obligation" between the United States
government and Indian tribes in passing the AIRFAA.'" The Court agreed
with the government that "[t]he legislative background of AIRFAA thus
reflects that in enacting the statute, Congress relied on the principles outlined
in Mancari."'10 5 The court noted that even UDV does not dispute this."°
Instead, UDV focused its argument on the federal regulation, 7 rather than the
AIRFAA.' 08 However, the court's discussion of AIRFAA and Mancari merits
further analysis.
In Mancari, non-Indian employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
challenged the employment preference for qualified Indians."° Concerning
103. Id. (citations omitted).
104. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft (0 Centro 11), 282 F.
Supp. 2d. 1271, 1276 (D.N.M. 2002).
105. Id. at 1277.
106. Id.
107. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31.
108. 0 Centro, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1277.
109. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 537 (1974).
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the special treatment of Indians relative to other groups, Mancari held that
"[a]s long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of
Congress' unique obligation toward Indians, such legislative judgments will
not be disturbed.""'  The Mancari Court found that the BIA's hiring
preference "is not directed towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians';
instead, it applies only to members of 'federally recognized' tribes."''.
According to BIA policy, in order for an individual to be eligible for
preferential treatment, he or she must be one-fourth or more degree Indian
blood and be a member of a federally recognized tribe." 2 Thus, Mancari's
political classification is seemingly applicable only to Indians with at least
twenty-five percent Indian blood who are also members of federally
recognized tribes." 3 In other words, it is apparent that Congress would not
have a unique obligation to an "Indian" who could only show that she
possessed fifteen percent "Indian blood."
The term "Indian blood" seems to refer to a racial rather than political
classification. The Mancari Court however, noted that "[t]he preference, as
applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as
members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities.. . ." " Nonetheless, in order for
Mancari to apply, the individuals in question would apparently need to
contain at least twenty-five percent Indian blood.
Although, in support of its argument, the government cited Mancari
primarily to show that Congress relied on the Court's decision in passing the
AIRFAA, rather than for the racial/political analysis, it is nonetheless worth
discussing for the purpose of establishing a very important point: Not all
members of the NAC have at least twenty-five percent Indian blood." 5 The
court does not avoid confronting the discussion of this pivotal issue." 6 If
indeed some NAC members are not legally "Indian," then § 1307.31 seems
unconstitutional. In other words, if all members of the NAC qualified as
"Indians," an undoubtedly protected political class toward whom the United
110. Id. at 555.
111. Id. at 554 n.24.
112. Id.
113. See Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1216 (5th Cir. 1991).
114. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554.
115. See Brief for Respondents at 22 n. 10, Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao
do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006) (No. 04-1084), 2005 WL 2228369 ("But the NAC has
always had non-Indian members.. ."); United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 n.3
(D.N.M. 1991).
116. See 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft (0 Centro I1), 282 F.
Supp. 2d 1271, 1276-82 (D.N.M. 2002).
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States government has a unique obligation, then giving the NAC an
exemption from Schedule I substances appears constitutionally valid.
However, if not all NAC members are legally "Indian," then the government,
through § 1307.31, appears to be violating the Establishment Clause by
promoting one religion over all others. In other words, the "unique
obligation" justification stated in Mancari would be severely weakened when
applied to the NAC, and would justify the exemption of a very similar
substance in hoasca to a similarly situated religious group, UDV. Of course,
if the NAC is comprised of only Native Americans, then one could scarcely
argue that a small group of non-Indians from New Mexico is similarly
situated to a people possessing such a unique history as Native Americans.
Furthermore, the government does not have a "unique relationship" with
a politically or racially mixed church, even if that church possesses the title
of "NAC." Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate
commerce with the Indian tribes, but would not condone such power of
regulation over a church, whose congregation is decided not on political
classifications, but rather on theological devotion, and other conventional
standards. In essence, if the NAC has at least a noticeable number of non-
Indian members, it might as well be just another church - theology aside.
Therefore, the ultimate question is whether non-Indian members, or people
with less than twenty-five percent Indian blood, are allowed to join the NAC.
The answer must be yes. In United States v. Boyll, the court found that "the
vast majority of Native American Church congregations, like most
conventional congregations, maintains an 'open door' policy and does not
exclude persons on the basis of their race." ' I  "As a result, non-Indian
members are accepted within the [NAC].""' In Boyll, a long-time, non-
Indian member of the NAC was indicted for importing peyote." 9 The court
held that Mr. Boyll was indeed a member of the NAC under their common
"open door" policy. 20
The court did not ignore this strong evidence, which is bolstered by
affidavits of several NAC members.12 ' The court relied on Peyote Way
Church of God v. Thornburgh.122 In Peyote Way, a non-Native American
church, brought an equal protection claim similar to UDV's, challenging the
117. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. at 1336.
118. Id. at 1337 n.3.
119. Id. at 1335.
120. Id. at 1337.
121. Id.
122. Peyote Way Church of God v. Thomburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991).
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exclusiveness of the NAC exemption.'23 Like the UDV case, Peyote Way
turned on whether non-Indians were valid members in the NAC. Indeed, if
non-Indians were allowed to use peyote in the NAC, the Peyote Way court
would be strained to concoct a constitutional justification for denying those
same people (non-Indians) the same right merely because they joined a
different religious organization. In fact, the founder of Peyote Way,
Immanuel Trujilio, was a former NAC member. 24 Unlike Boyll however, the
Peyote Way court found that "all NAC members are of [twenty-five percent]
ancestry," and thus, all members would fall under the political classification
of Mancari125 Thus, Boyll and Peyote Way are in complete disagreement as
to whether all NAC members have at least twenty-five percent Native
American ancestry.
There are reasons for this discrepancy. Essentially, the Peyote Way court
relied on the testimony of NAC National Chairman, Emerson Jackson, and
chose to adopt the technical or official interpretation of NAC "membership,"
as it is recorded in the NAC articles of incorporation.'26 Peyote Way
corroborates Jackson's statements by merely citing that the "record contains
articles of incorporation filed by the [NAC] of Navajoland, Inc., and a
'Certificate of Authorization' to transport peyote that requires a tribal
enrollment number . ,,*"'2 The court also noted Jackson's testimony that
"[i]n our bylaws, we stipulate that [members] be [twenty-five percent]
Indian."' 2' Jackson, as a top political figure of the NAC, is merely citing the
rule.'29 The court and Jackson both adopted an overly narrow, albeit official,
interpretation of the word "member," and essentially asserted that "the rule
says, therefore it is." However, the court's mere reciting of a rule does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that all NAC members are of twenty-five
percent Indian blood.
This type of scenario may be recreated hypothetically. Suppose that boys
are not allowed on the girls' high school basketball team. Under allegations
that some of the team's members are actually boys in disguise, the coach
confidently cites the student handbook, which clearly and unsurprisingly
states: "only girls are members of the girls' basketball team." This means that
123. Id. at 1212.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1215.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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a boy cannot officially be a member of the girls' team. Thus, he will not
receive class credit, get his name mentioned under the team photo in the
yearbook, or get his own locker in the girls' locker room. But is it possible
that he could nonetheless play basketball on the girls' team? Absolutely.
Admittedly, this hypothetical scenario is not perfectly representative of the
case at hand; however, there are likely thousands of non-Indian people who
would call themselves "members" of the NAC. Likewise, according to the
"open door" policy described in Boyll, these same people would likely be
referred to as "members" by the Native American members in their
congregation.'30 The non-Indians would probably not attend their respective
churches if they had not in the first place been welcomed by Native American
members. Likewise, Indian members would not invite non-Indians to their
place of worship, share their sacred peyote with them, fellowship with them,
and engage in an intimate spiritual experience through sacred rituals with
them, and then afterwards not even refer to them as mere members. The
Peyote Religion considers it sacrilegious to use peyote for nonreligious
purposes, and thus Indian members would not likely share it with those who
they considered as non-members.'
However, the court, adopting Mr. Jackson's stance in Peyote Way,
ultimately decides that the DEA's interpretation of § 1307.31 distinguishes
and excludes the wannabe, non-card carrying criminals by the difference in
their "blood" or "political classification," both of which are secret code words
for "race." Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the power to
"regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes,"'3  not to regulate racially
restrictive requirements for NAC membership. It is not Congress, but rather
members of the church congregation who should decide with whom they wish
to have fellowship and share their sacred substance.
Peyote Way is wrong, and thus so is the court's memorandum. Not all
members of the NAC possess at least twenty-five percent Indian blood. It is
absurd and short-sighted for the government to assert that a genuinely
devoted practitioner of the Peyote Religion is denied membership to a church
of her faith because she has twenty-four percent Indian blood, or even no
Indian blood, especially if she is welcomed by the Native American members
of a particular NAC congregation. The court even concedes the fact that
130. See United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1336-37 (D.N.M. 1991).
131. See Jack F. Trope, Protecting Native American Religious Freedom: The Legal,
Historical, and Constitutional Basis for the Proposed Native American Free Exercise of
Religion Act, 20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 373, 380 (1993).
132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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"some local peyotist congregations may welcome non-Indian members," yet
concluded that the term "Native American Church" is broad and
unambiguous, meaning that § 1307.31 is ambiguous.'33 The court then
consulted extrinsic material to decide that the DEA, in promulgating §
1307.31, meant to exclude all but Indian members of the NAC to receive the
benefits of the peyote exemption.'34 The court further relied Congress'
legislative history of the AIRFAA to bolster the DEA's supposed
interpretation -- that the term "Native American Church" applies to Indian
members only.'35
Of course, the courts and Congress should not construe the definition of
"Native American Church" to breach reasonable boundaries, and thus allow
anyone to use a Schedule I substance. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that not
all members of the NAC possess at least twenty-five percent Indian blood.
This fact makes the NAC much more similarly situated to UDV.
Furthermore, the DEA's granting of an exclusive exemption to the NAC,
especially when NAC membership is not, in practice, predicated upon legal
Indian heritage, results in an impermissible legislative classification of the
basis of religion in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, irrespective of
First Amendment issues. The Supreme Court has stated that when such a
classification exists, "equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny... ."36
As of now, the two religious organizations are disparately situated despite
similarities in religious practice. Both shaman-based religions regard as vital
to their religion, the consumption of similar Schedule I substances producing
similar hallucinogenic effects.'37 Additionally, both religions consider the
consumption of their respective entheogens outside of ceremonial religious
contexts to be sacrilegious. 3'
Unfortunately for UDV, many insincere religious groups comprised of
mere addicts and dealers have made it difficult for sincere religious
movements like UDV to obtain equal protection rights. For example, in
133. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft (0 Centro I), 282 F. Supp
2d 1271, 1278 (D.N.M. 2002).
134. Id. at 1278.
135. Id.
136. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per curiam).
137. See 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 342 F. 3d 1170, 1174
(10th Cir. 2003) (discussing the importance of hoasca to UDV); see also 0 Centro II, 282 F.
Supp. 2d at 1281 (discussing the importance of Peyote to Native Americans).
138. 0 Centro, 342 F.3d at 1185 ("[U]sing [hoasca] outside the religious contest is a
sacrilege."); United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1335 (D.N.M. 1991) ("It is considered
sacrilegious to use peyote for nonreligious purposes.").
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United States v. Meyers,'39 a criminal defendant moved, under RFRA, to
dismiss marijuana charges against him and "testified that he is the founder
and Reverend of the Church of Marijuana and that it is his sincere belief that
his religion commands him to use, possess, grow and distribute marijuana for
the good of mankind and the planet earth."' 4 ° Other, perhaps more sincere
religious groups have inadvertently left behind jurisprudential obstacles for
UDV. In McBride v. Shawnee County,14 1 members of the Rastafarian religion
who were convicted on marijuana charges asserted that it was
unconstitutional for the state of Kansas to permit the religious use of peyote
in the NAC, but not the Rastafarian church. 42 In denying their assertion, the
court correctly concluded that "[t]he two religions are not similarly situated
because the circumstances surrounding their drug use is drastically
different."' 143 NAC members generally ingest peyote at carefully-planned road
meetings, while the use of marijuana in the Rastafarian church is
uncontrolled. 44  Likewise, unlike Rastafarians with marijuana, UDV
members carefully control their hoasca consumption. 45 "Hoasca is ingested
at least twice monthly at guided ceremonies lasting about four hours.' ' 46 Like
Meyers and McBride, other cases involving marijuana, unsurprisingly, have
had little success. 147 However, hoasca is distinguishable in that it has a much
lower chance for distribution outside the controlled religious realm of
UDV. 48  Likewise, hoasca and marijuana differ in that "[m]arijuana is
associated with problems of abuse and control, leading courts to ascertain a
particular government interest in its prohibition even for religious uses.' 49
Thus, arguments attempting to compare the failure of religious equal
protection claims involving marijuana to UDV's situation are not at all
persuasive. Marijuana and hoasca are clearly different drugs not only
concerning their propensity for abuse, but also in their availability. One drug
139. 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996).
140. Id. at 1479.
141. 71 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Kan. 1999).
142. Id. at 1100.
143. Id. at 1101.
144. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcrofi (0 Centro If), 282 F.
Supp. 2d 1271, 1283 (D.N.M. 2002).
145. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 1170, 1174
(10th Cir. 2003).
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., State v. Balzer, 954 P.2d 931 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
148. See 0 Centro 1, 282 F. Supp. 2d. at 1265-66.
149. 0 Centro, 342 F.3d at 1185.
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is widely available and used throughout the country, while the other is
consumed by roughly 130 people in the State of New Mexico. 5
V. Conclusion
The UDV court arrived at the correct result under the RFRA, but should
have also upheld UDV's valid equal protection claim. The equal protection
issue is especially important because it presents another valid medium for
sincere religious organizations who rely on prohibited entheogens to achieve
their own religious experience. Courts have cited the unique relationship that
the government has with the Indian tribes as a legitimate reason for denying
other religious individuals and groups similar religious rights.' 5 ' Not only is
this reasoning short-sighted, but such a standard effectively prohibits any
other group, from now until eternity, from achieving the type of religious
equal protection asserted by UDV. In other words, it is essentially impossible
for any other socio-ethnic group to establish the type of special, historical
relationship that exists between the United States government and the tribes.
Thus, if all sincere religious practices involving controlled substances are
swiftly prohibited, no group will ever have the time to establish their own
religious entheogen in the same way that the Native Americans have
established peyote, unless the government actually gives them a chance to
show that they are not abusing the drug, either through consumption or
distribution, but rather are relying on it for sincere religious reasons. Equal
protection demands a more achievable standard, especially where religious
neutrality is at stake.
150. See 0 Centro I, 282 F. Supp. 2d. at 1240.
151. See generally, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
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